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Abstract
This talk proposes a logic for reasoning about (multi-agent) epistemic probability models,
and for epistemic probabilistic model checking. Epistemic probability models are multi-agent
Kripke models that assign to each agent an equivalence relation on worlds and an equivalence
relation on lotteries over worlds, where a lottery over (finite) world set W is a function from W
to the positive rational numbers.
Uncertainty about probability is modelled as equivalence of lotteries. The difference with
the usual approach is that probability is linked to knowledge rather than belief, and that “agent
a knows that ϕ” is equated with “agent a assigns probability 1 to ϕ.”
To motivate our approach, we formulate and prove a Certainty Theorem, stating that certainty
in an epistemic probability model M corresponds to knowledge in the epistemic model that
results when all lottery information gets erased from M . It follows immediately from this that
the certainty operator in epistemic probability logic is an S5 operator.
If there is time, the talk will also introduce PRODEMO, a model checker for epistemic
probability logic that can be used to keep track of information flow about aleatory acts among
multiple agents.
Probability as a function of degree of information
Dans les choses qui ne sont que vraisemblables, la diffe´rence
des donne´es que chaque homme a sur elles, est une des causes
principales de la diversite´ des opinions que l’on voit re´gner
sur les meˆmes objects.
Laplace [Lap14]
Relation between Probability and Knowledge
Agent a knows ϕ iff the probability a assigns to ϕ equals 1.
Let Paϕ be the probability that agent a assigns to ϕ.
Certainty implies Truth
Paϕ = 1→ ϕ.
Positive Introspection into Certainty
Paϕ = 1→ Pa(Paϕ = 1) = 1.
Negative Introspection into Certainty
Paϕ < 1→ Pa(Paϕ < 1) = 1.
Earlier proposals on combining knowledge and probability [FH94,
Koo03b, Koo03a, BGK09, BS08, Gie09], and many more. These
proposals do not equate knowledge with certainty.
Lotteries
A W -lottery l is a function from a set of worlds W to the set of pos-
itive rationals, i.e., l : W → Q+. Two W -lotteries l, l′ are equivalent
if for some q ∈ Q+, l′ = (λp 7→ q ∗ p) · l.
We say that two W -lotteries l, l′ have the same scale if∑
{l(w) | w ∈ W} =
∑
{l′(w) | w ∈ W}.
A W -lottery l is normalized on B ⊆ W if∑{l(w) | w ∈ B} = 1.
If we have a lottery l : W → Q+ and a block B ⊆ W in a partition of
W , then this determines a probability distribution P on B, by means
of (we assume that B 6= ∅):
P (w) =
l(w)∑{l(w′) | w′ ∈ B}.
Lotteries with Unknowns, or Lottery Functionals
To handle cases where it is given that no probability distribution for
an event exists, we allow lotteries with unknown factors.
A W -lottery with unknowns Q ⊆ P (or: a W -lottery functional over
Q) is a function from (0..1)Q to W -lotteries, where (0..1) is the open
unit interval ⊆ Q.
Thus, the type of a W -lottery with unknowns Q is:
(Q→ (0..1))→ W → Q+
Constructing Lotteries from Lottery Functionals
Let B be a function that assigns probabilities to the members of Q,
i.e., B : Q → (0..1). Let l be a normalized W -lottery (i.e., a lottery
with scale 1), and let V be a valuation for W . Then Ll,V,B is the
W -lottery given by:
Ll,V,B(w) = l(w)
×
∏
{B(p) | p ∈ Q, p ∈ V (w)}
×
∏
{1−B(p) | p ∈ P, p /∈ V (w)}.
Then for all w ∈ W , Ll,V,B(w) ∈ (0..1) ⊆ Q, so Ll,V,B is a W -lottery.
The function B 7→ Ll,V,B is a lottery functional.
Example: Von Neumann’s Trick
How to obtain fair results from a coin with unknown bias [vN51]:
Toss the coin twice. If the results match, start over and forget
both results. If the results differ, use the first result.
Example: Von Neumann’s Trick
How to obtain fair results from a coin with unknown bias [vN51]:
Toss the coin twice. If the results match, start over and forget
both results. If the results differ, use the first result.
Represent the coin as a lottery functional for the set {h}. LetB assign
a probability to h. That is, Bh is the coin bias. Then the probabili-
ties of the four possible outcomes of Von Neumann’s procedure are
represented by the following lottery:
{hh : Bh2, ht : Bh −Bh2, th : Bh −Bh2, tt : (1−Bh)2}.
This shows that the cases ht and th are equally likely, so interpreting
the first as h and the second as t gives indeed a model of a fair coin.
Urn Example
Say there are two urns, U and V . U contains one black marble and
two white marbles, V contains one black marble and one white mar-
ble. This is common knowledge among a, b and c. Now a selects
one of the urns, without revealing which one to b, c. Then b picks a
marble from it, without revealing the marble to a, c.
Representation
0 : (U, b)
1 : (U,w)
2 : (V, b)
3 : (V,w)
{0 : 16, 1 : 13, 2 : 14, 3 : 14}
Another Representation
0 : b
1 : w
l0 : {0 : 12, 1 : 12}
l1 : {0 : 13, 1 : 23}
Lotteries over lotteries
Example from [Gne75]:
There are five urns with the following compositions: 2 urns with 2
white and 3 black balls each, 2 urns with 1 white and 4 black balls
each, and one urn with 4 white balls and 1 black ball. A ball is chosen
from one of the urns taken at random. It turns out to be white. What
is the probability (after the experiment) that the ball was taken from
the last urn?
Representation
0 : b
1 : w
l0 : {0 : 35, 1 : 25}
l1 : {0 : 45, 1 : 15}
l1 : {0 : 15, 1 : 45}
L : {l0 : 25, l1 : 25, l2 : 15}
Another Representation
0 : b
1 : w
l0 : {0 : 35, 1 : 25}
l1 : {0 : 35, 1 : 25}
l2 : {0 : 45, 1 : 15}
l3 : {0 : 45, 1 : 15}
l4 : {0 : 15, 1 : 45}
Coin Tossing
Suppose Alice is tossing a coin while Bob is watching. Both know
that the coin can either be fair or biased (say, with bias 23 towards
heads). Bob does not know which coin Alice is using, but Alice
knows.
0 : H
1 : T
l0 : {0 : 12, 1 : 12}
l1 : {0 : 23, 1 : 13}
Standard Epistemic Models
A standard epistemic model for a set P of propositions and a set A of
agents is a tuple (W,V,R) where
• W is a non-empty set of worlds,
• V is a valuation function that assigns to every w ∈ W a subset of
P.
• R is a function that assigns to every agent a ∈ A an equivalence
relation Ra on W .
L0 language of multi-agent epistemic logic:
ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ
where p ranges over a set P of basic propositions and a ranges over a
set of agents A.
Epistemic Probability Models
To change a standard epistemic model into an epistemic probability
model, we assign to each agent an equivalence relation over a list of
lotteries. This represents subjective probabilities.
An epistemic probability model is a tuple (W,V,R, L, I, E) where
• W , V , R are as above.
• L is a set ofW -lotteries indexed by natural numbers (displayed as
{l0, l1, . . .}), with index set I , all lotteries having the same scale.
• E is a function that assigns an equivalence relation on I to each
agent a ∈ A.
Epistemic Probability Language
L language of multi-agent epistemic probability logic:
ϕ ::= > | p | lj | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | t1 + · · · + tn ≥ q
t ::= q | t · Paϕ
Abbreviations
• ⊥, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ϕ1 → ϕ2, ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2.
• t < t′ for ¬t ≥ t′.
• t > t′ for ¬t′ ≥ t.
• t ≤ t′ for t′ ≥ t.
• t = t′ for t ≥ t′ ∧ t ≤ t′.
• t 6= t′ for t > t′ ∨ t < t′.
• Pa(ϕ1|ϕ2) = t for t · Pa(ϕ2) = Pa(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2).
• lj expresses that the current lottery index equals j.
• Paϕ = q expresses that the probability of ϕ according to a equals
q.
• Pa(ϕ1|ϕ2) = q expresses that according to a, the probability of
ϕ1, conditional on ϕ2, equals q.
Truth
Let M = (W,V,R, L, I, E), let w ∈ W , let i ∈ I .
M,w, i |= > always
M,w, i |= p iff p ∈ V (w)
M,w, i |= lj iff i = j
M,w, i |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that M,w |= ϕ
M,w, i |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M,w, i |= ϕ1 and M,w, i |= ϕ2
M,w, i |= t1 + · · · + tn ≥ q iff [t1]w,i + · · · + [[tn]w,i ≥ q
Probability
[q]w,i := q
[t · Paϕ]w,i := [t]w,i × Pa,w,i(ϕ).
P and D Functions
Pa,w,i(ϕ) =
∑{Da,w,j(ϕ) | iEaj}
|{j | iEaj}| .
Pa,w,i(ϕ) gives the average of the probabilities that a assigns to ϕ in
w, for all lotteries that a confuses with li.
Da,w,i(ϕ) =
∑{li(u) | wRau and M,u, i |= ϕ}∑{li(u) | wRau} .
Da,w,i(ϕ) gives the probability that a assigns to ϕ in w, assuming that
a knows li, i.e., assuming that a does not confuse li with any other
lottery.
Note that Da,w,i(li) = 1, and for all j with j 6= i, Da,w,i(lj) = 0.
Common Knowledge of Indifference Models
If M = (W,V,R) is an epistemic model, then M indif is the epistemic
probability model (W,V,R′, L, I, E) where
W ′ = W
V ′ = V
R′ = R
L = {l0} where l0 = λw ∈ W 7→ 1
I = {0}
E = λa ∈ A 7→ {(0, 0)}
Explanation: M indif is the epistemic probability model that is the re-
sult of putting a uniform probability distribution on the worlds in M ,
and making this uniform probability distribution common knowledge.
Common Knowledge of Indifference about p, q
0 : pq
1 : pq
2 : pq
3 : pq
l0 = {0 : 14, 1 : 14, 2 : 14, 3 : 14}
Erasing Probability Information From Models
If M = (W,V,R, L, I, E) is an epistemic probability model, then we
can map this to an epistemic modelM ◦ by puttingM ◦ = (W ◦, V ◦, R◦)
with
• W ◦ = {(w, i) | w ∈ W, i ∈ I}
• V ◦ = λ(w, i) 7→ V (w)
• R◦ is given by (w, i)R◦a(u, j) iff wRau and iEaj.
Note that if M is an epistemic probability model where the agents
share a single lottery, then M ◦ is the result of removing the lottery
information.
Relation of Knowledge and Certainty
Define a translation t : L0 → L from the language of multi-agent
epistemic logic to the language of epistemic probability logic by means
of:
t(p) := p
t(¬ϕ) := ¬t(ϕ)
t(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) := t(ϕ1) ∧ t(ϕ2)
t(Kaϕ) := Pat(ϕ) = 1
This translates knowledge statements of L0 into certainty statements
of L, and allows us to prove the Certainty Theorem.
Certainty Theorem
Theorem 1 (Certainty) For any epistemic probability model
M = (W,V,R, L, I, E),
any world-index pair (w, i) forM , any ϕ ∈ L0:
M ◦, (w, i) |= ϕ iffM,w, i |= t(ϕ).
Proof. Induction on the structure of ϕ. The only case you have to
check is Kaϕ. 2
This theorem motivates the following abbreviation for L:
Use Kaϕ for Paϕ = 1.
This abbreviation reflects the equation of knowledge and certainty.
It follows immediately from the Certainty Theorem that the certainty
operator Paϕ = 1 is an S5 operator.
Example: Uncertainty about q-bias
0 : pq
1 : pq
2 : pq
3 : pq
l0 = {0 : 14, 1 : 14, 2 : 14, 3 : 14}
l1 = {0 : 13, 1 : 16, 2 : 13, 3 : 16}
In this model, at world 0 and lottery l0, the probability that a (repre-
sented by solid lines) assigns to p is 1, so Kap is true at 0, l0. Kaq is
false at 0, l0, for the probability that a assigns to q is less than 1. It
equals the average of the probabilities that a assigns to q for the two
lotteries.
Axioms
Propositional Logic Axioms
• All (instances of) tautologies of propositional logic are axioms.
• The Modus Ponens Rule: from ` ϕ and ` ϕ1 → ϕ2 conclude
` ϕ2.
Probability Axioms
(P1) ` Pa> = 1
(P2) ` Pa(¬ϕ) = 1− Paϕ
(P3) ` Pa(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = Paϕ1 ∗ Paϕ2
Derivable Principles
From (P2), (P3) we derive:
` Pa(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = Paϕ1 + Paϕ2 − Paϕ1 ∗ Paϕ2
` Pa(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = 1 + Paϕ1 ∗ Paϕ2 − Paϕ1
Pa(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = 1 ↔ 1 + Paϕ1 ∗ Paϕ2 − Paϕ1 = 1
↔ Paϕ1 ∗ Paϕ2 − Paϕ1 = 0
↔ Paϕ1 ∗ Paϕ2 = Paϕ1
↔ Paϕ1 = 0 ∨ Paϕ2 = 1
From this:
` Paϕ1 > 0 ∧ Pa(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = 1→ Paϕ2 = 1 (*)
Formula (∗) can be viewed as a probabilistic version of the K-axiom
in epistemic logic.
Certainty Axioms
(C1) ` Paϕ = 1→ ϕ
(C2) ` Paϕ ≥ t→ Pa(Paϕ ≥ t) = 1
(C3) ` Paϕ < t→ Pa(Paϕ < t) = 1
Note that the following is derivable from (C1) and (P2):
` Paϕ = 0→ ¬ϕ.
Lottery Axiom
(L) ` Pa(li1 ∨ · · · ∨ lin) = 1→ Pa(p ∧ li1) + · · · + Pa(p ∧ lin) = n · Pap.
(L) expresses the definition of the probability of a basic fact as the
average over its probabilities with respect to all accessible lotteries.
Probability Rule
(PR) If ` ϕ1 → ϕ2 then ` Paϕ1 ≤ Paϕ2.
From (PR) we derive:
• If ` ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 then ` Paϕ1 = Paϕ2.
Also derivable is the necessitation rule for certainty:
• If ` ϕ then ` Paϕ = 1.
Polynomial inequality axioms
• All instances of valid formulas about polynomial inequalities are
axioms.
Cf. Halpern [Hal03, Section 7.7].
Commom Prior
The assumption that agents have a common prior, widely used in epis-
temic game theory, is not built into our concept of an epistemic prob-
ability model. If we want to impose this condition, we need a formula
or set of formulas for it. In case both the number of agents and the
number of atomic propositions are finite, we can express it in a single
formula: ∧
a,b∈A,p∈P
Pap = Pbp.
For infinite sets of agents or propositions we need an infinite number
of formulas to express the fact that the agents have a common prior.
Completeness
This is a complete system for epistemic probability logic (I think).
Allowing Lotteries with Unknowns
If we want to allow lotteries with unknowns in our models, then the
language should be extended with expressions Bp with meaning: the
(unknown) probability of p, and lotteries should allow for factors Bp.
Model representing a coin with unknown bias:
0 : p
1 : p
l0 : {0 : Bp, 1 : 1−Bp}
A Paradox of John Maynard Keynes
Represent an urn withmwhite marbles and n black marbles as (m,n).
0 : (0, 2)
1 : (1, 1)
2 : (2, 0)
l0 = {0 : 13, 1 : 13, 2 : 13}
Represent an urn as a stack of marbles:
0 : WW
1 : WB
2 : BW
3 : BB
l0 = {0 : 14, 1 : 14, 2 : 14, 3 : 14}
The ‘Paradox’
According to the first model, the probability that both marbles are
black is 13.
According to the second mode, the probability that both marbles are
black is 14.
How is this possible?
This is the question John Maynard Keynes posed in his book [Key63].
The Answer
The answer is that in the first model the principle of indifference was
applied in the wrong way.
Compare also the puzzle about the probability that a family with two
kids has two boys. This probability is 14 rather than
1
3, for the relevant
cases are BB, BG, GB and GG. If we represent as 2B, B + G and
2G, then we must bear in mind that the pattern B + G is twice as
likely as the two other patterns.
It is all a matter of representation. If we represent “consider an ar-
bitrary urn with k marbles, either black or white” in terms of (m,n),
then we have to add the lottery information that the pattern (m,n)
gets lottery value
(
m+n
m
)
.
Updates: Public Announcement
If M = (W,V,R, L, I, E) is an epistemic probability model, then
Mϕ = (W ′, V ′, R′, L′, I ′, E ′) is the epistemic probability model given
by
• W ′ = {w ∈ W | for some j ∈ I :M,w, j |= ϕ}.
• V ′ is the restriction of V to W ′.
• R′ assigns to each agent a the relation R′a that is the restriction of
Ra to W ′.
• L′ is the set of lotteries from L with an index in I ′ = {j ∈ I |
for some w ∈ W :M,w, j |= ϕ}.
• E ′ assigns to each agent a the relation E ′a that is the restriction of
Ea to I ′.
A Language with Public Announcement
Let LPA be the extension of L with public announcements, where
[ϕ1]ϕ2 expresses that after the public announcement of ϕ1, ϕ2 holds.
More precisely:
M,w, i |= [ϕ1]ϕ2 iff M,w, i |= ϕ1 implies Mϕ1, w, i |= ϕ2.
Calculus for epistemic probability logic with PA
Add the following principles for public announcement:
(PA1) ` [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
(PA2) ` [ϕ1]¬ϕ2 ↔ ¬[ϕ1]ϕ2
(PA3) ` [ϕ1](ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)↔ ([ϕ1]ϕ2 ∧ [ϕ1]ϕ3)
(PA4) ` [ϕ1](Paϕ2 = q)↔ (Pa([ϕ1]ϕ2 | ϕ1) = q)
Axiom (PA4) was proposed by Johan van Benthem.
Plus the rule of announcement generalization:
From ` ϕ1 derive ` [ϕ2]ϕ1.
Calculus for epistemic probability logic with PA
Add the following principles for public announcement:
(PA1) ` [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p)
(PA2) ` [ϕ1]¬ϕ2 ↔ ¬[ϕ1]ϕ2
(PA3) ` [ϕ1](ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)↔ ([ϕ1]ϕ2 ∧ [ϕ1]ϕ3)
(PA4) ` [ϕ1](Paϕ2 = q)↔ (Pa([ϕ1]ϕ2 | ϕ1) = q)
Axiom (PA4) was proposed by Johan van Benthem.
Plus the rule of announcement generalization:
From ` ϕ1 derive ` [ϕ2]ϕ1.
Completeness
If the above calculus of epistemic probability logic is complete, then
adding the axioms and rule for public announcement gives a complete
calculus for epistemic probability logic with public announcement.
Updates: Public Change
A P substitution is a finite list of bindings p := ϕ. This determines a
substitution P→ L in the usual way.
A public change is a substitution σ applied to the valuation at all
worlds:
V M,σ,i(w) = {p ∈ P |M,w, i |= σ(p)}.
This depends on the lottery.
If we wish to avoid that dependence, then we have to restrict the for-
mulas ϕ allowed in substitutions.
Updates: Non-determinate Change
In a probabilistic setting, a public change update can be non-determined,
in the sense that different things might happen with certain probabili-
ties.
To model this, we can represent an action as a lottery over substitu-
tions.
Example:
·
p := >
p := ⊥
1
2
1
2
Use of Non-determinate change for creating coin flip models
0 : p
1 : p
l0 : {0 : 12, 1 : 12}
A Puzzle of Lewis Carroll
An urn contains a single marble, either white or black. Mr A puts
another marble in the urn, a white one. The urn now contains two
marbles. Next, Mrs B draws one of the two marbles from the urn. It
turns out to be white. What is the probability that the other marble is
also white? (Gardner [Gar81])
Solution with PRODEMO
Call the first white marble p and the second one q. Mrs B does not
know whether she is drawing from ¬p + q or from p + q.
Let’s start with a model of complete ignorance about p, for two agents
a, b:
m1 :: Pem Prp
m1 = initPM [a,b] [P 0]
*PRODEMO> m1
MO [a,b] [0,1] [(0,[p]),(1,[])]
[(a,[[0,1]]),(b,[[0,1]])] [0,1]
[[(0,1 % 2),(1,1 % 2)]] [(a,[[0]]),(b,[[0]])] [0]
First update
Result of telling a the value of p, while b does not learn this fact.
m2 :: Pem Prp
m2 = upd [P 0] m1 um1
This gives:
*PRODEMO> m2
MO [a,b] [0,1]
[(0,[p]),(1,[])]
[(a,[[0],[1]]),(b,[[0,1]])]
[0,1]
[[(0,1 % 2),(1,1 % 2)]]
[(a,[[0]]),(b,[[0]])]
[0]
Putting a second white marble in the urn.
A public change that makes q true:
m3 :: Pem Prp
m3 = upd_pc [P 0,Q 0] m2 [(Q 0,Top)]
The result:
*PRODEMO> m3
MO [a,b] [0,1] [(0,[p,q]),(1,[q])]
[(a,[[0],[1]]),(b,[[0,1]])]
[0,1]
[[(0,1 % 2),(1,1 % 2)]]
[(a,[[0]]),(b,[[0]])]
[0]
Removing either p or q from the bag
Nobody knows which of these two takes place. Note that removing p
from the bag has as precondition that p is true, and similarly for q.
Result of updating with this:
m4 :: Pem Prp
m4 = upd [P 0,Q 0] m3 um2
Here is what this model looks like:
*PRODEMO> m4
MO [a,b] [0,1,2]
[(0,[q]),(1,[p]),(2,[])]
[(a,[[0,1],[2]]),(b,[[0,1,2]])] [0,1,2]
[[(0,1 % 3),(1,1 % 3),(2,1 % 3)]]
[(a,[[0]]),(b,[[0]])] [0]
What is the probability that the other marble is also white?
In our setting: what is the probability of p∨q? It is different for a and
b.
*PRODEMO> prob m4 a 0 0 p_or_q
1 % 1
*PRODEMO> prob m4 a 1 0 p_or_q
1 % 1
*PRODEMO> prob m4 a 2 0 p_or_q
0 % 1
*PRODEMO> prob m4 b 0 0 p_or_q
2 % 3
*PRODEMO> prob m4 b 1 0 p_or_q
2 % 3
*PRODEMO> prob m4 b 2 0 p_or_q
2 % 3
Work in Progress
• Implementation of epistemic probability model checking with
PRODEMO.
• Completeness proofs for various axiom systems (e.g., for exten-
sions of the language with (relativized) common knowledge op-
erators).
• Investigation of ‘lottery bisimulations’.
• Extensions: Handling of Lottery Functionals
• Design and analysis of probabilistic protocol languages for epis-
temic probability updating.
• Connections with Bayesian learning, treating Baysian learning as
increase of knowledge rather than change of belief.
• See homepages.cwi.nl/˜jve/software/prodemo/
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